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BOOK REVIEW

BOOK REVIEW
By Frank D. Emerson and Franklin
C. Latcham. Cleveland, Ohio: The Press of Western Reserve
University, 1954. 242 pp. $4.00.

SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY.

The authors, one of them with a background of experience as
an SEC attorney, have in the past contributed to legal periodicals
a searching series of articles on the use of the proxy device in
the modern corporation, with particular emphasis on the operation of the SEC's proxy rules. Now the substance of these articles,
revised to some extent with a view to reaching the corporate executive and general reader, is available in Shareholder Democracy,
a lively and readable little book with sufficient documentation
collected in appendices to make it useful to the practicing lawyer
as well. The book should have particular interest for the student
of corporation finance, for probably nowhere else has there been
as extensive an examination of the impact of the SEC's proxy
rules upon the modern corporation.
These rules as they have finally evolved would have been
startling indeed had they represented the original plan for Government control in this area. The first rules provided simply that
stockholders solicited for their proxies should be told what the
voting was about. Later it was felt that the information was not
too helpful if the only alternatives available to the stockholders
were to vote for or against the management proposals in toto,
so the rules were amended to provide that the stockholders be
given an opportunity, on the form of proxy, to vote for or against
each specific management proposal. If the management knew of
an impending proposal of a minority stockholder and intended
to vote against it, the SEC view was that stockholders solicited
for their proxies should be informed of this management intention; and as a next step it seemed appropriate to permit the stockholders to vote for or against this proposal too. Later it seemed
only fair to amend the rules to provide that the proponent of such
a proposal be given an opportunity to state his point of view
briefly in his own words - all in the management's proxy-soliciting material.
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Thus the SEC's proxy rules evolved to the point where, general
attendance at the annual meeting no longer being feasible under
modern conditions, it became possible for the minority stockholder, at company expense, to address his fellow stockholders
through the mails in somewhat the same manner that he could
address them at the meeting if they attended the meeting. The
result? Minority stockholders have availed themselves of this
privilege on extremely rare occasions; when a minority stockholder does present such a proposal for action by his fellow stockholders it is ordinarily quite sane and moderate even by conservative standards; and almost invariably his fellow stockholders
vote it down in overwhelming numbers. It may be added that
almost invariably the management's proposals are adopted by the
same preponderance of votes.
The authors counsel patience. They see the history of shareholder participation as a golden age of self-government, followed
by a period of decline during which the means to effective selfgovernment were taken away, followed by a struggle under the
aegis of the SEC to restore to the stockholders what was thus
lost - and they argue that time must necessarily be allowed for
overcoming the apathy that took hold during the decline. The
practices of the golden age emerge but dimly; in any event it
should be clear that the large public corporation of today is a
unique phenomenon and that analogies to the earlier corporate
scene and to the political scene are of limited value. The authors
are more realistic and more knowing when they discuss the tactical
problems of the proxy battlefield: the problems of timing in solicitation of proxies, of getting the stockholders' list, of neutralizing
the brokers who hold large quantities of stock in street names, of
equalizing the financial burdens and advantages of the "ins" and
the "outs". Here the authors are on their own ground. Of special
interest is their story of particular proxy battles and of generalship successful and unsuccessful. Their book should be enlightening and useful to a wide audience.
Alfred Hill.*
*Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University School of Law.

